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Summary
This report has been prepared on the basis of research on the Integrated
Regional Operational Programme (IROP) using the EU structural funds in the
budget period 2004–2006. The research was carried out by the Institute of
Public Affairs in 2006. The main conclusion from the study is the conviction
that the management system of the IROP does not sufficiently prevent
political and administrative corruption. The project selection procedures and
the recently changed tendering system are particularly threatened with
corruption. The research carried out by the Institute of Public Affairs points to
a number of reasons for that situation: (1) too complicated multistage
management process, (2) inappropriate division of responsibilities among
different public authorities as well as between politicians and officials, (3)
poorly designed institutions (for instance, regional steering committees), (4)
imprecise regulations concerning, for example the necessity to ensure
transparency of the procedures, (5) lack of special regulations to prevent
corruption, (6) political and administrative culture in Poland. That is why the
system for managing the regional programmes in the years 2007–2013, that is
now being designed, should take into account the conclusions presented in this
report, and should also be analysed from the point of view of limiting the
possibility of corruption.  
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Introduction1
In recent years, we have seen extensive development of debate among
experts and academics, concerning corruption. Phenomena related to various
administrative pathologies, including corruption, can be found in all countries,
irrespective of their development level, government policy, economic or social
system2. They are also present in the European administration and EU policies,
especially those related to redistribution of funds from the EU budget3.
Therefore, it is no wonder that researchers, civil society organisations and the
general public are particularly interested in the EU structural funds, related to
the implementation of EU policies and improvement of social and economic
cohesion across the enlarged Europe. The new member states, which joined
the EU in May 2004, have the reputation of countries with a poor quality
public administration, additionally prone to corruption. That is why the
interest in corruption threats related to the use of structural funds in those
countries is particularly justified. 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide an assessment of corruption
threats embedded in the management system of the regional development
programme for the years 2004–2006 – the Integrated Regional Operational
Programme (IROP). The analysis presented in this study covers the main three
phases of the public funds management. 
1) First, the funds programming, which is the least exposed to corruption. 
2) Second, the selection of projects, which is threatened by both the pathology
of political corruption and administrative corruption as well. 
1 This report has been prepared on the basis of the research on the Integrated Regional Operational
programme (IROP) which uses the EU structural funds in the financial period 2004–2006. The
research was carried out  in 2006, by the following employees and experts of the Institute of Public
Affairs: Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, PhD, Urszula Koz³owska, Jacek Kucharczyk, PhD (IPA
Programming Director), Jaros³aw Zbieranek.
2 Por. V. Tanzi (2002): Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures in:
G. T. Abed, S. Gupta (ed.) – Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, Washington:
International Monetary Fund. 
3 C. Shore (2005): Culture and Corruption in the EU: Reflections on fraud, nepotism and cronyism
in the European Commission, in: D. Haller, C. Shore (ed.) – Corruption, Anthropological
Perspectives, London: Pluto Press. 
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3) The third stage of the analysis applies to the implementation of projects,
and, related to that, evaluation of the monitoring and supervision systems. 
As I have mentioned before, the purpose of the assessment of the IROP
management system is to provide an initial evaluation of corruption threats,
which is required for a research project carried out by the Institute of Public
Affairs, in order to give the right focus to further, more detailed analyses to be
carried out under that project. 
IROP funds account for approximately 36 percent of all EU assistance
funds in the years 2004–2006 (not taking into account the Cohesion Fund and
CAP direct payments). IROP is co–financed from two EU structural funds:
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund
(ESF). The amount of funds spent under this programme is significant, the
highest amount spent in all new Members States. 4,083.9 m Euro of public
funding has been allocated for the implementation of IROP, including 2,968.5
m Euro (2004 prices) from structural funds resources. The level of
co–financing from EU funding will reach 72%. It has been estimated that the
structure of EU funds involvement in the implementation of structural policy
in Poland, broken into individual structural funds, will be the following:
ERDF – 85.2 percent  (2,530.0 m Euro) and ESF – 14.8 percent (438.5 m
Euro). Additionally, domestic public funding in the amount of 1,115.5 m Euro
will be involved in the implementation of development activities. Apart from
the public funding, the implementation of IROP will also engage private
funding. The total value of the necessary contribution on the part of private
entities is estimated to be ca. 146.2 m Euro4.
The main objective of the programme under analysis is to provide
conditions for improving regional competitiveness and to counter
marginalisation of some areas in such a way, as to facilitate the long–term
economic development of Poland, its economic, social and territorial cohesion
and its integration with the European Union. 75 percent of all IROP funding
has been earmarked for infrastructure projects. The majority of funds have
been allocated for improvement of living standards and for other social
purposes. Investment has been  focused largely on the basic infrastructure
targets (road, utilities, environmental infrastructure), including activities
related to local infrastructure, with relatively little significance for regional
development. This means that the main beneficiary of the programme (that is
an institution submitting a project) are territorial self–governments and
administration bodies subordinate to local government. Entrepreneurs
G³osy ekspertów6
4 Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004–2006, Ministry of Economy, Labour and
Social Policy, Warsaw 2004, p. 148.
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participate in the programme mainly by carrying out investment projects
commissioned by local administration units, to a lesser extent, through
activities supporting the enterprises themselves. Similarly, the participation of
social partners and non–governmental organisations is relatively small, the
biggest in human resources development activities. IROP has been designed
to achieve the following priorities:
● Priority 1: Development and modernisation of infrastructure to enhance the
competitiveness of regions (approx. 59.4 percent of all IROP funds). Special
emphasis is placed on modernisation of technical and social infrastructure,
affecting the development potential of a region.
● Priority 2 : Strengthening human resource development in the regions (14
percent of all funds). The objective of this priority is to provide conditions
for the development of human resources on the regional and local level. The
emphasis is placed on retraining of workers before they become unemployed
and on supporting farmers intending to leave agriculture. 
● Priority 3 : Local development (24.5 percent of all funds). The main
objective of this priority is to counter marginalisation, which is done by
supporting mainly basic infrastructure investment at the local level.   
● Priority 4: Technical Assistance (1.3 percent of all IROP funds). Under this
priority support is provided to institutions involved in the implementation of
the programme, i.e. the IROP Managing Ministry, offices subordinate to
regional governments and voivods (who represent the central government in
the regions), local self–government. They will receive support for
employment of staff, training, equipment, etc.  
Estimate of the division of funds into priorities implemented under IROP 
(in Euro in 2004 prices)
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 7
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Source: Integrated Regional Operational Programme 2004–2006, Ministry of Economy, Labour
and Social Policy, Warsaw 2004, p. 148.
Before presenting the main part of the analysis, it may be worthwhile to
make a reference to literature on corruption in investment programmes
implemented with the involvement of public funds. The point is to specify the
basic evaluation criteria which would make it possible to carry out a proper
assessment of the IROP management system. 
The results of research in this area, carried out by economists, in most cases
show the negative sides of corruption for economic and investment processes. It
is not, however, always unequivocal and unquestionable. For instance, according
to earlier studies, corruption may increase economic efficiency, especially from
the microeconomic point of view, as it removes administrative barriers or
accelerates the administrative process related to economic activity5. Other studies,
on the other hand, indicate that a peculiar expression of a company’s
entrepreneurship and competitiveness is its capability of using the corruption
mechanism and  offering the most attractive bribe6. 
The vast majority of economists, however, present research results, including
statistical studies, which point out to the negative sides of corruption. According to
them, corruption reduces economic growth and economic efficiency7. It lowers the
level of economic investment8, both private and public. Corruption limits the amount
of public revenue and  increases public expenditure9. At the same time, public
investment projects which involve corruption are usually less efficient, of poorer
quality and more expensive than investment resulting from fair tender procedures10.
SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS8
5 N. Leff (1964): Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, American Behavioral
Scientist, pp. 8–14; S. P. Huntington (1968): Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven:
Yale University Press, F. T. Lui (1985): An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 93, August. 
6 P. J. Beck, M. W. Maher (1986): A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets,
Economics Letters, vol. 20, no. 1, D. H. D. Lien (1986): A Note on Competitive Bribery Games,
Economics Letters, vol. 22, no. 4. 
7 H. Poirson (1998): Economic Security, Private Investment, and Growth in Developing Countries,
IMF Working Paper no. 98/4, Washington, IMF; V. Tanzi (2002): Corruption Around the World:
Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures in: G. T. Abed, S. Gupta (ed.) – Governance, Corruption
& Economic Performance, Washington: International Monetary Fund; C. Leite, J. Weidmann
(2002): Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth, in:
G. T. Abed, S. Gupta (ed.) – ibid. 
8 P. Mauro (1995): Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, August.  
9 V. Tanzi (2002): Corruption Around the World: ibid. 
10 V. Tanzi, H. Davoodi (1997): Corruption, public investment, and growth, IMF Working Paper
97/139, Washington: IMF. 
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Moreover, it is pointed out that bribery may encourage officials to prolong the
procedures and the time of delivering a service to entrepreneurs11. This means that the
complexity of bureaucratic procedures, delays in those procedures, create favourable
conditions for the emergence of corruption offers aimed at facilitating or accelerating
the administrative process. According to many economists, a winner of a corrupt
tender procedure is not the one who is the most economically efficient, he only takes
the most advantage of the corruption dividend12.
Summarising the results of studies on corruption in investment
programmes,13 it is possible to define the following criteria, which would
allow us to make an initial assessment of the corruption threat in IROP. 
1) Comprehensive information on investment programmes processes and
making all the phases of public activity open to the public reduces the
occurrence of corruption. It is particularly important to widely disseminate
information about competitions and investment tender procedures, to
publish information about selected projects and about tender results,
together with the justification concerning the substance of the decision.  It is
also important to place the relevant information on the Internet.  
2) Placing the appropriate financial procedures for selection and
implementation of investment projects in the electronic environment,
including the use of electronic tools for posting all financial decisions in the
account books, may significantly reduce corruption. 
3) Another way to curb corruption is to divide individual procedures into
stages and to divide the responsibility for their implementation among
different institutions or departments. Another procedure connected with
practical anti–corruption activities is the “many pairs of eyes” principle,
which means avoiding situations when decisions are made by one person. 
4) An important element of countering corruption is to formally specify the
principles and the criteria for making decisions as well as appropriate
supervision and enforcement of their correct application. It should be
remembered, however, that not all formal principles are defined in a precise
way and that some formal rules may in fact favour corruption.   
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 9
11 G. Myrdal (1968): Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, New York: Twentieth
Century Fund. 
12 Eg. W. J. Baumol (1990): Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 98, October, K. M. Murphy, A. Shleifer, R. W. Vishny (1991): The
Allocation of Talent: Implication for Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, May, 
F. T. Lui (1996): Three Aspects of Corruption, Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 14. July.  
13 See T. G. Grosse (2006): Miêdzynarodowe doœwiadczenia w przeciwdzia³aniu korupcji w
administracji publicznej in: C. Trutkowski (ed.) – Przejrzysty samorz¹d. Podrêcznik dobrych
praktyk, Warszawa: Wyd. naukowe Scholar; T. G. Grosse (2000):  Dzia³ania anty-korupcyjne w
pañstwach cz³onkowskich OECD, Batory Foundation, Programme „Against Corruption”,
Warsaw–Florence.
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5) An important element of curbing corruption is to introduce formal rules
against conflict of interest and systematic enforcement and supervision of
the observance of those rules. One of the ways to regulate those issues is to
introduce property declarations and to refrain from making decisions on
matters that are in any way related to personal interests of the
decision–maker or to his professional or public functions. An important
way to ensure impartiality is to attach particular attention to the evaluation
of investment projects on their merit, which also entails the use of the
services of independent, professional experts, auditors and institutions
supporting the administration in the investment process, which are not in
any way related to the subject matter nor the parties involved in a given
investment project. 
6) An important element of countering corruption is an efficient system of
supervision, monitoring and inspection. It may also be helpful to introduce
a special reporting procedure to notify of administrative irregularities or
suspicions of corruption (whistleblowing procedure). Another instrument
are reports on irregularities on the basis of which corrections to
management systems are made or registers are drawn up of people
(companies) guilty of committing irregularities, who may be excluded from
participation in investment programmes for a certain period of time. 
7) An excessively complicated administrative system, bureaucratic
procedures, extensive and complicated documentation create favourable
conditions for corruption, connected, among other things, with informal
expediting of administrative procedures. The fact that project
implementation is often prolonged and delayed because of lengthy
administrative procedures, may lead to corruption offers aimed at
expediting those procedures. 
8) Excessive pressure on absorption of funding may be conducive to
administrative irregularities, including situations favourable for the
occurrence of corruption.
9) Excessive centralisation of the management system  and the so called
procedural “bottlenecks” may lead to temporary work pile–up, excessive
haste, organisational chaos and pressure to spend public money as quickly
as possible. During such periods, a climate may be formed for the
occurrence of irregularities in the implementation of investment
programmes, including also a possibility of corruption.  
SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS10
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Analysis of IROP management system
(A) Programming phase
It is possible to list two basic functions performed by local
self–government politicians dealing with regional development. The first
consists in development programming, that is preparation of strategic and
operational documents related to regional development as well as
appropriate content related criteria, ensuring the implementation of a
content–oriented policy. The other function is to supervise whether the
political choices arising out of the strategic and operational documents are
correctly implemented. In this sense the role of regional politicians is limited
to supervising the work of officials and experts implementing the regional
policy and correcting it with reference to previously taken programming
decisions, eliminating irregularities committed by officials, including
occurrences of corruption. 
Improperly exercised supervision of the regional policy implementation
process provides opportunity for administrative corruption. I use this
concept to describe the abuse of power by officials with a view to getting some
private benefits or to describe bias towards certain social and economic
interests. Whereas irregularities in the regional policy implementation process
or excessive or unjustified intervention of politicians in the process of
implementation of investment projects may lead to political corruption. It is
a phenomenon of power abuse by politicians in order to gain some party or
electoral benefits.  That is exactly why the scope of politicians’ intervention in
the regional development programmes implementation process should be
limited solely to correcting the errors of the administration, including those
related to inadequate implementation of the regional policy directions. Such
correcting is carried out by appropriate monitoring and supervision bodies. It
should also, each time, be justified formally and from the content point of
view (in relation to the law, the strategic documents and the criteria for the
directions of the regional policy). 
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Centralisation of programming
The programming system of  IROP is centralised. The key programming
decisions in this respect have been taken by officials in the ministry competent
for regional development (since 1 November 2005 it has been the Ministry of
Regional Development). The decisions have been made on the basis of
guidelines and have been agreed with the European Commission officials,
who also had to endorse the final version of the programme. The role of
regional politicians in relation to regional development programming under
IROP has been practically limited to issuing opinions on subsequent versions
of the programme, sent to them by central government officials. It is worth
noting that the Managing Authority for IROP is the ministry competent for
regional development and not the regional self–government of the voivodship
(region). That means that the ultimate responsibility for preparing IROP and
the so called Programme Complement (i.e. providing more detailed contents
for particular voivodships) rests with that ministry. It is also responsible for
efficiency and correctness of the overall management, which means that it
takes the most important organisational and programming decisions, and it is
also the main appellate body in case of any procedural problems. Important
auxiliary functions in relation to the substantive focus  of the programme are
carried out by the Monitoring Committee operating at the ministry managing
the IROP. The Committee examines and approves the content–related criteria
for project selection for each of the IROP measures, and it endorses the above
mentioned document  IROP Complement.
The key factor for the centralisation of the  IROP management system was
the decision to have one regional development operational programme
(instead of sixteen). Under one operational programme all the sixteen regions,
regardless of their external conditions or development strategies, have the
same list of priorities and very similar proportion of financing for particular
measures. In a situation when IROP is becoming the most important
instrument of regional development in Poland, it obviously limits the
possibilities for regional voivodship self–governments to shape their regional
development policies in an independent way. 
Very limited participation of voivodship self–governments and of local
government politicians in regional development programming is the reason
why, at this stage of management, there is little room for political corruption.
Such occurrences are mainly related to discussions at the central level. For
instance, during IROP programming, the way of dividing the funds among
voivodships was of key importance. At the time when that decision was at the
consultation stage, there were evident attempts of lobbying by individual
regions in favour of setting out the most attractive financial conditions. It was
SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS12
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also possible to exert some political pressure, behind the scenes, between the
central government and the local government politicians representing the same
political force currently in power14.  
Another consequence of the limited participation of regional and local
politicians in IROP programming is the natural shift of their interest towards
subsequent stages of management, and in particular, towards the selection of
projects for financing under IROP. This means a far–reaching intervention in
the work of officials, significantly exceeding the content–related supervision
and inspection. This has been confirmed in a systemic way, by establishing the
institutions and the project selection procedures. The final decision as to that
selection belongs to the Voivodship Board, i.e. the executive body of the
voivodship self–government, grouping only regional politicians (instead of
apolitical managers). Also at the earlier stage of the procedure, politicians
have many possibilities to make arbitrary decisions.  Regional Steering
Committees, consisting mainly of regional and local politicians (or officials
designated by them), can change the decisions earlier made by officials and
experts in this respect. These are at least two institutional opportunities for
political corruption to occur.  
(B) Project selection phase
Most of the projects implemented under IROP are selected on the basis of
open competitions, announced regularly for particular measures of the
Programme. Therefore beneficiaries submit their own proposals for the
implementation of particular measures of the IROP. It is rarely the case that big
projects are entered for implementation in the regional Programme Complement.
From the point of view of corruption prevention it is less important whether the
projects have been submitted in open competitions or whether they have been
included earlier in the operational programme in the form of larger projects.  The
important points are, in particular (1) maximum simplification and transparency
of those processes, (2) transparency of the selection criteria, (3) quality of the
legal regulations defining the selection principles, with particular emphasis
placed on special regulations to prevent corruption, (4) precise definition of the
role of politicians and officials in both processes, (5) appropriate design of the
institutions responsible for decision–making. 
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 13
14 See a similar discussion and competition of political influences in the ruling camp during the
division of fund for regional programmes for the years 2007–2013: W. Pelowski (2006): PiS ma
czwarty ju¿ pomys³ na podzia³ funduszy UE, Gazeta Wyborcza, dated 11–07–2006. 
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The main project selection procedure in IROP takes place at the regional
level and is supervised by voivodship self–governments. It covers four stages: 
1) formal assessment of projects by officials of the Marshal Office,
responsible for IROP duties vested in the voivodship self–government,
2) technical and content evaluation by expert panels,
3) political recommendation by Regional Steering Committees (RSC),
4) adoption of final decisions concerning individual projects by the
Voivodship Board. 
Under the project implemented by the Institute of Public Affairs we have
analysed in detail just this project selection procedure. It is worth
remembering that there are three other procedures which apply to some of the
priorities and measures under IROP. The first is related to measures
implemented under Priority 2 on human resources development and to
Measure 3.4 (Micro–enterprises) implemented under Priority 3. It is similar to
the above mentioned, main procedure for project selection. It has been
supplemented with a procedure under which the voivodship self–government
prepares annual framework action plans, indicating the types of activities and
their budget.  The framework planes must obtain RSC recommendation and
are then adopted by the Voivodship Board. On that basis the main project
selection procedure begins.  
The remaining project selection procedures have been centralised and
transferred to the  IROP Managing Ministry. As far as Measure 1.6 Public
transport development in agglomerations, is concerned, implemented under
Priority 1, projects are submitted directly to the ministry, which then arranges
further project selection stages: (1) procedure of formal assessment by
officials, (2) panel of experts and the technical and content related assessment
of projects, (3) recommendation of the National Steering Committee,
appointed solely for this Measure (it is a body operating on the central level at
the IROP Managing Authority); (4) final decision making by the minister
competent for regional development. Also at the central level the procedure
for selecting applications submitted under Priority 4, Technical Assistance is
located. The applications are assessed by the ministry officials from the point
of view of their form and content, in accordance with the provisions of the
IROP Complement. The main decisions on the selection of applications are
made by a special committee appointed by the IROP Managing Ministry,
consisting of representatives of the central government, voivods (central
government representatives in regions) and voivodship self–governments. The
IROP Managing Ministry also decides about the acceptance of projects
submitted by voivodship self–government authorities under Priority 2 (thus
the voivodship self–government is the beneficiary of those projects). 
SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS14
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Centralisation of the project selection procedure in the cases described
above shifts the risk of political and administrative corruption to the level of
the IROP Managing Ministry. Extensive scope of duties of the ministry and
insufficient resources of well–qualified officials15 increase the risk of
administrative corruption occurrence. At the same time, direct influence of
central government politicians on project and application selection decisions
may be conducive to the temptation of political corruption and informal
influencing of those decision–makers by their party colleagues who represent
some territorial interests (e.g. deputies, representatives of regional and local
self–government authorities). Further in my analysis, I will focus only on the
basic project selection procedure, that is I will examine the possibility of
corruption occurrence at the regional level. It is worth noting, however, that
the above mentioned human resources problems in the IROP Managing
Ministry affect the corruption threat also in the main stream of the project
selection procedure. I have in mind the procedure of appeal from the decisions
made by Voivodship Boards. The Supreme Chamber of Control (Najwy¿sza
Izba Kontroli – NIK)16 report indicated that in 2005 this task was performed
by just one employee, which resulted in a work pile–up, gigantic delays and
provided opportunity for abuse.   
Transparency of competitions 
One of the prerequisites to countering corruption in investment
programmes is providing comprehensive information about competitions and
tenders, as well as caring for the widest possible participation of project
applicants in those activities. The obligation to inform about call for projects
under IROP lies mainly with voivodship self–governments. Research shows17
that Marshal Offices in all voivodships publish information about subsequent
calls for projects, both at their Internet websites and in regional press. In some
voivodships too little time was given for submitting project documentation
(sometimes even less than two weeks), which, taking into consideration the
complexity and the extensiveness of the required documentation, may have
hindered the process of project submission by beneficiaries.  In addition,
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 15
15 Human resource deficiencies and the poor quality of the background knowledge in the IROP
managing ministry are also pointed out in the Supreme Chamber of Control’s report: NIK (2006):
Information on the results of inspection of the use of structural funds under the Integrated Regional
Operational Programme (IROP), Warsaw, p. 12.  
16 NIK (2006), p. 26. 
17 Por. Przejrzyste Fundusze Strukturalne (2006), Instytut Ekonomii Œrodowiska, CEE Bankwatch
Network, Dolnoœl¹ska Fundacja Ekorozwoju, p. 17. 
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frequent procedural changes, including those concerning project submission
forms or required attachments, made the process additionally difficult. Other
research18 shows that beneficiaries have not been informed of the results of the
formal and content–related assessment and that time schedules for calls for
projects have not been publicly announced.  The above mentioned difficulties
may have been conducive to the occurrence of corruption.  
The research conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA)19 indicates
that voivodship self–governments place on their Internet websites only the
minimum information required by the Manual on IROP implementation
procedure20. Only very few of them provide electronic access to all ranking
lists and project assessment documents after each stage of the project selection
procedure. What is missing, is mainly the access to minutes from the meetings
of decision–making bodies or justifications of decisions made by political
bodies, which change the assessment of a project or its place on a ranking list
as compared to the earlier technical and merit–based assessment. Information
on the Internet is often unclear, sometimes out–of–date. There is no clear
guidance on available appellate procedures. There is no information about
special anti–corruption procedures, for instance those related to reporting the
occurrence of irregularities (whistleblowing). In many regions information
about the experts who asses projects is not disclosed, which makes it
impossible to check whether they are real professionals or whether they are
not officially subordinated to the voivodship self–government. The IPA
research clearly shows that the Internet websites of the Œwiêtokrzyskie and
Zachodnio–pomorskie voivodships give the poorest quality information about
the  implementation of IROP. In many regions communicating with officials
via electronic mail is also very difficult. 
The IPA research provided an opportunity to notice that regulations
concerning transparency of competition procedures, and in particular those
regulating the way of presenting information by voivodship self–governments
are imprecise, inappropriate or that they are wrongly interpreted by regional
governments. The regulations defined by the ministry managing the IROP21 do
not provide for any coherent standard of presenting information on the Internet
websites. There are no detailed regulations as to the scope of information on
SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS16
18 NIK (2006), p. 8. 
19 J. Zbieranek, U. Koz³owska (2006): Access to information about the distribution of structural
funds on regional level, w: SAVE PUBLIC ASSETS: Monitoring Corruption Threats in the
Distribution of Structural Funds. The Case of Poland, typescript, Instytut Spraw Publicznych,
Warszawa. 
20 See [Manual on IROP implementation procedure] Podrêcznik procedur wdra¿ania ZPORR z
za³¹cznikami – version of 28 October 2005 (including the amendments of 2 December 2005),
points 6.1.9.1., Ministry of Regional Development, Warsaw. 
21 See Manual on IROP implementation procedure… ibidem.
Ksiazka.qxd  3/27/2007  4:05 PM  Page 16
particular stages of competitions procedures to be presented. For instance,
there is no obligation to publicise the grounds for decisions of the Voivodship
Boards changing the order of the project ranking list22. The regulation included
in the Manual on IROP implementation procedure concerning the restrictions
to making the information of the composition of the experts panel public is
inappropriate23. Quite often the regulations are wrongly interpreted by
voivodship self–government, which practically leads to limiting the access to
information. For example, confidentiality declarations whose purpose is to
protect personal data, commercial or business secrets, are used to restrict the
openness of information on how the individual members of the
decision–making bodies voted. They can also cause certain people to refrain
from reporting irregularities. Thus interpretation of some binding regulations
by regional self–governments increases the possibility of corruption,
especially political corruption.   
Formal verification of applications
The first phase of the project selection procedure is the formal verification
of applications by Marshal Offices officials. Among problems related to that
phase of the procedure, one should be mentioned first of all, namely the
guidelines sent by the IROP Managing Ministry, which were frequently
changed and often raised interpretation questions. That made it necessary to
supplement the previously submitted projects or to repeat individual stages of
the assessment24. Moreover, the imprecise formal assessment criteria provided
room for interpretation freedom for officials, which may lead to development
of corruption.  The complexity of the documentation and delays resulting from
the guidelines changes were also conducive to corruption. An example of that
may be a case noted by the press, of an official who offered to facilitate the
procedure for project applications prepared by her husband’s consultancy25. 
A study carried out by the Polish Confederation of Private Employers
„Lewiatan”26 shows that in activities addressed to business, cases of officials
extorting a bribe often take place, with the bribes reaching even 10 percent of
the available public aid. 
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 17
22 See Manual on IROP implementation procedure… ibidem, p. 55. 
23 See Manual on IROP implementation procedure… ibidem, p. 40. 
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Another problem at this stage of the procedure is the insufficient
knowledge of the subject matter and the number of officials assessing the
applications. A study carried out by the Supreme Chamber of Control showed,
that in some offices, in spite of the formal verification which had taken several
months, the applications approved for implementation contained serious
formal and content–related errors27. It also happened that project verification
was carried out by just one person, that is, in breach of the basic
anti–corruption principle and contrary to the guidance provided by the Manual
on IROP implementation procedure28. It is also worth noting that the
procedure of assessment by officials is to a great extent duplicated later on in
the project implementation, i.e. by the voivod’s officials who prepare the
project financing agreement. 
A serious deficiency of the project selection procedure and also of the
subsequent stages of managing the project, are the prolonged difficulties with
the launch of the computer programme SIMIK. It was assumed that the
software would be an efficient tool for IROP management, reducing the
possibility of corruption. However, the delays in launching particular modules
of the programme make it virtually impossible to manage the IROP at the
project level (it is not possible to input project application data). It is worth
noting here, that the SIMIK system was expected to be fully implemented in
early 2004. Whereas the costs of launching the computer system, that is not
yet fully operational, amounted to over 12.5 m PLN (over 3 m Euro) by the
end of 2005, half of which came from the EU budget.  The European
Commission has warned Poland that if the computer system is not completed
by the end of 2006, the transfer of all structural funds to Poland may be
withheld29.  
Assessment by experts
The next stage of the project selection procedure is the technical and
content–related assessment carried out by panels of experts. The panels are
appointed by voivodship self–governments according to guidance from the
IROP Managing Ministry, provided in the Manual on IROP implementation
procedure. Formal requirements for appointing the experts, described in the
Manual, are imprecise. However, what is even worse, they are often not
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observed in practice.  That is related to the lack of appropriate mechanisms of
supervising the work of experts by the Managing Authority, as well as to the
insufficient disciplinary sanctions for experts and Marshal Offices for errors in
appointing and in operation of the expert panels. As a result, subsequent
research points out numerous irregularities in the work of those bodies. A
Supreme Chamber of Control’s report30 showed frequent cases of insufficient
qualifications of experts or their limited experience in regional policy,
including failure to satisfy the formal requirement of five years experience in
investment projects. In consequence, the opinions issued on projects were
erroneous or issued without appropriate assessment against the required content
criteria. In some cases project assessment was made without the required
justification in the final project assessment card31. That means a relatively great
extent of arbitrariness on the part of experts, which is a factor conducive to
corruption.  It also has negative effects for the proper implementation of the
regional policy directions. That makes some commentators express severe
criticism of this stage of the procedure in which the substantive content of the
project is of secondary importance32. An additional factor making it easier for
the experts to be arbitrary in their decisions, is the insufficient openness of their
work. The panellists sign confidentiality declarations and the exact information
about the number of points granted to projects broken down into individual
criteria, is not always publicly announced (e.g. via Internet)33. In addition, the
Manual on IROP implementation procedure limits the possibilities to disclose
information about the composition of expert panels34, which makes the public
control over their professionalism and impartiality even more difficult. 
Impartiality of the experts is not sufficiently regulated, especially as far as
the conflict of interest situations are concerned. Even though the panel
members do sign impartiality declarations, there is practically no procedure to
check the truth of those declarations nor are there any sanctions for their
breach. The lack of instruments that would effectively prevent the occurrence
of conflict of interests, both at the stage of the formal as well as
content–related and technical assessment of a project, significantly increases
the possibility of corruption. There have also been charges against some
expert panels35, that they are more willing to be driven by guidance from
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regional politicians (e.g. Voivodship Boards) than by the content–related
project assessment criteria. This may indicate a possibility of the occurrence
of political corruption practices. This is related to the fact that, as the IPA
research has shown36, some experts are recruited from among officials
subordinated to the voivodship self–government authorities. This indicates a
possibility that the assessment of projects may be influenced by some external
factors not related to their contents, and may even be a signal of a political
corruption risk. 
Assessment by the Regional Steering Committee
The next stage of the procedure is the opinion issued by the Regional
Steering Committee (RSC) on the ranking list of projects prepared by the
expert panel. The Committee operates under the  guidance of the Voivodship
Marshal, i.e. the head of the voivodship self–government and the head of the
Voivodship Board. It groups representatives of regional administration
designated by the voivodship self–government, representatives of the central
government administration (of the voivod), representatives of local
self–governments and social partners, i.e. civil society organisation from a
given voivodship. The idea behind calling this body to participate in the
project assessment process was to guarantee the implementation of the
partnership principle in regional policy. The point was to ensure appropriate
civil society supervision over the project selection, exercised by NGOs and
entities participating in the implementation of IROP. The essence of that idea
was to create a body, bringing together many people, who represented
different social interests involved in IROP. It was assumed that RSCs could
contribute to significant reduction of administrative pathologies, including
administrative and political corruption.  
It seems that the original objective of RSC operation has not been achieved
in practice, for two reasons. Firstly, because of the low representativeness of
the people delegated to work in RSC, who do not fully reflect the range of
entities involved in  IROP and the related social, territorial and economic
interests. Secondly, the RSC activities are not limited only to supervising the
correctness of project selection, but they also, relatively often, lead to changes
on the project ranking list. Quite often such decisions are not properly justified
and are poorly explained to the public. Such actions are contrary to the
guidance issued by the ministry competent for regional development, included
in the Manual on IROP implementation procedure. It is worth noting at this
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point that the above mentioned guidelines are imprecise and too narrowly refer
to the RSC’s obligation to give access to information.  Often a misunderstood
need for protection of confidential information was quoted as an excuse for
hiding the justification of the decisions taken37. Research38 also points to
situations when the lack of openness of the proceedings and hiding
documentation is justified by reference to the guidance proposed by the IROP
Managing Ministry. It is an example of using the guidance contrary to the
ministry’s intentions and against the “spirit” of the provisions of the Manual
on IROP implementation procedure. It may give rise to suspicions that the
arbitrariness of those decisions is related to the occurrence of political
corruption. Research39 and press reports40 point out to the charges against the
RSCs that it are driven not by the project content but by political or personal
criteria. That in turn is related to the weakness of mechanisms preventing the
conflict of interests among the RSC members while taking the decisions to
make changes to the project ranking lists.  Even though the RSC members do
sign impartiality declarations, there is no system to verify them and no
sanctions for a breach of the impartiality principle.  
Earlier research and press reports are confirmed by interviews with
members of RSC conducted in the autumn of 2006 by the Institute of Public
Affairs (IPA). The major influence on decisions taken by that body is exerted
by voivodship self–government authorities and the representatives of local
self–governments who take part in RSC meetings. Representatives of the
regional and local self–governments often informally agree on how they are
going to vote on the project ranking list. As one of the respondents has put it,
the predominant practice is the “today we are voting for your project,
tomorrow – for mine” principle41. The research has also shown that decisions
are not taken on the basis of the substantive regional policy criteria but mainly
in relation to territorial preferences. These are related to representing the
interests of a given local self–government (gmina or poviat) that is, they are
connected with the willingness of the decision–makers to ingratiate
themselves with the voters from the constituency from which the RSC
members come or with the Voivodship Board. Such a way of selecting
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38 Przejrzyste Fundusze Strukturalne (2006), p. 34–38.
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kolejce do NIK (2005), Gazeta Prawna, No. 76 (1441), 2005–04–19; Minister trzyma kciuki (2005),
Gazeta Prawna, No. 78 (1443), 2005–04–21.  
41 Interview with a member of an RSC, 22 September 2006. 
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projects falls within the category of the so called electoral corruption, where
irregularities connected with project selection result from the desire to be
re–elected.  
The practice of being driven by party affiliation or personal connections
have also been noted in the interviews42. Whereas in the IPA study on the
analysis of the documents related to project selection procedure43 no cases of
changing the decisions of political bodies under the influence of a political
party have been noted. It was, however, noticed that there had been some
geographical preferences in the decision making related to representing
particular interests connected with constituencies of the decision–makers.  
The people interviewed by IPA also pointed to a problem of poor
representativeness of those delegated to RSCs. There were no clear procedures
and rules for selecting the representatives of particular social groups.
Sometimes the selection was influenced by the Voivodship Board, in
accordance with their preferences, which were not disclosed. There were also
cases where the Board was unwilling to have any representative of NGOs
selected44, or a case of an NGO representative who was actually a subordinate
of the Voivodship Marshal45 etc. Representatives of citizens associations were
treated with suspicion and reluctance, also because they did not participate in
the “negotiations” of the territorial self–government representatives.
Moreover, as people usually not directly interested in project selection (that is,
not representing the associations who had submitted the projects) – they could
potentially play a role in supervising the correctness of the project selection
process. In practice, that was really difficult because (1) they were poorly
represented in the works of RSCs, (2) the minutes of the RCS meetings were
not made public, (3) there was not enough interest in those works on the part
of the public, and what is the most important, (4) the essential decisions were
taken outside the RSC meetings, that is, because of the earlier informal
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42 In one of the interviews the following situation was described: „During the meeting the Marshall
received a phone call and changed his decision: an application was selected for which the
Kaszubsko–Pomorskie Association had lobbied, an organisation that has a right to place candidates
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ruling party – Law and Justice [Prawo i Sprawiedliwoœæ]; intervoew of  22 September 2006. 
43 See U. Koz³owska (2006): Badanie zale¿noœci regionalno–politycznych w ramach dystrybucji
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44 Interview with a representative of a RSC of 22 September 2006. 
45 Interview with a representative of a RSC of 20 September 2006.
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arrangements between the representatives of territorial self–governments
delegated to work on those Committees.   
Decisions of Voivodship Boards
The final decision on project selection is taken by appropriate Voivodship
Boards. Research46 shows that the Boards often exercise their power to change
the order of projects on the ranking list, which is vital for the practical
implementation of projects.  Changes made by the Boards are not always
properly justified. The justification, as it was in the case of RSCs, is not
always presented to the public, e.g. on the Internet website of the Marshal
Office. Therefore, in the press one can often come across accusations of the
political and not content–related background of the Boards’ decisions47. 
In–depth interviews conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs bring
examples of decisions taken by Voivodship Boards which changed the
decisions earlier made by experts. According to the respondents, it is not a
frequent practice as the Voivodship Boards are in control of the earlier stages
of the project selection process (that is, the stage of the formal selection by
voivodship Marshall’s officials, the stage of the expert panel assessment and
also the RSC decisions). If, however, it comes to changing the order of the
project ranking list  – such decisions are not usually based on substantive
criteria related to regional policy. It was quite aptly put by one of the
respondents: “there were situations when projects that had received 95% of
point from expert panels were later rejected by a Voivodship Board. When the
RSC openly protested, the Board explained their decision by the principles of
the voivodship strategy and by the fact that expert panels are supposed to
assess projects only from the merit point of view. It is difficult not to agree
with such arguments, yet in that particular case, political reasons prevailed:
a friend from PSL [Peasants’ Party] needed to have a big project
implemented whereas the project that received the higher assessment was
submitted by a person from a competitive party”48. 
Interviews conducted by IPA also show how poor the justification of the
Voivodship Boards’ decisions is, and how reluctant they are to disclose those
reasons to the public. In addition, voivodship development strategy, which is
often invoked by the Boards, is treated by them in a purely instrumental way,
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as an excuse used to hide the real reasons behind their decisions, which do not
have anything to do with the content of a project.  
The practical operation of  RSCs and Voivodship Boards in the area of
project selection shows that they frequently go beyond the content–related
control whether the regional policy is properly implemented. Both stages, on
the other hand, provide ample opportunity for discretionary intervention to
local and regional politicians. Thus, they open an institutional “door” to
irregularities related to political corruption. It is also worth noting that the
format of RSCs operation and the electoral mandate for the voivodship
self–government provide some peculiar public legitimisation of decisions
which are not always consistent with the directions of the regional policy.
(C) Project implementation and supervision phase
In order to assess the corruption threat at the stage of project
implementation it is important to make an assessment of the following aspects: 
1) project financial management, 
2) correctness of project implementation by beneficiaries and implementing
institutions, especially in relation to tender procedures and public
procurement, 
3) system of monitoring and financial supervision. 
Further in the analysis I shall discuss the above mentioned project
implementation aspects. 
Project financial management system
The responsibility for the flow of funds financing the projects has been
vested in the central government administration. On the regional level, the
voivod’s administration is responsible for that.  The tasks of the voivod and
the Voivodship Offices officials include signing agreements granting
structural funding with entities whose projects have been approved for
implementation (i.e. beneficiaries). That is related to appropriate application
verification, financial supervision of project implementation and servicing the
IROP accounts at the regional level. The voivodship self–government
performs auxiliary tasks related to financial management only for Measures
under Priority 2 and Measure 3.4. (Micro–enterprises). In relation to them, the
voivodship self–government authorities sign framework financial agreements
with voivods. On that basis they subsequently sign agreements with
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beneficiaries and carry out monitoring and reporting activities in that respect.
At the central level, financial management has been vested in the so called
paying institution, i.e. the Ministry of Finance and the ministry managing the
IROP.     
The separation of the project selection stage from the financial management
has no significance for countering corruption. Therefore the division of those
tasks between the regional self–government administration and the voivod’s
administration does not affect the corruption threat in any significant way. For
eliminating the threat of corruption it seems much more important to separate
the programming phase from the project selection phase and to have a clear
definition of the roles of politicians and officials in those two processes.
Financial management is only of technical importance. It implements the
decisions taken at an earlier stage of the project lifecycle, when the project was
approved for implementation. Two issues, however, are important for proper
financial management: (1) simplification of the management system, with
reduction of unnecessary or duplicated stages of financial applications
approval; (2) the quality of financial supervision and effectiveness of correcting
the irregularities in the financing system. From this point of view, the IROP
financial management system shows some malfunctions, which may bring
about various irregularities related to project financing.    
The financial management system is complicated, time consuming and
multi–stage. Some procedures and activities are needlessly repeated by
various institutions. For instance, voivod’s officials formally verify the
applications for project financing, which duplicates the activities carried out at
the beginning of the project selection phase by Marshal Office officials. 
A report by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) shows that it caused
significant delays in concluding the agreements between voivods and
beneficiaries49. Then, the applications for financing processed by the voivod’s
officials are further verified at the IROP Managing Ministry. Its employees
check the applications from the point of view of their form and their contents.
According to NIK inspectors50 the “two pairs of eyes” rule, which safeguards
against the danger of corruption, is usually observed. However, ministerial
officials are not able to fulfil their task properly as they do not have access to
the whole documentation of the case. What is more, the fact that the same
documents are verified several times at different levels of management, makes
the whole procedure much longer. That was the reason why all the
applications for project expenditure refund were sent from the IROP
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Managing Ministry to the paying institution (Ministry of Finance) with a
major delay. The applications are verified again at the Ministry of Finance.  
The fact that the project financing procedure is multi–stage and centralised
leads to situations when a number of applications are piling–up, waiting to be
processed by the administration.    That in turn causes excessive haste and
pressure from political decision–makers in ministries to have the funds
absorbed by a certain deadline. Such conditions may give rise to inaccuracies
in application verification by officials and provide opportunity for occurrence
of various financial irregularities.  Even more so, as, as I have mentioned
before, the computer system SIMIK does not fulfil the requirements for
appropriate control over the correctness of project  financing. 
System of implementing projects and public procurement
According to available empirical data, the practical implementation of
projects is, in most cases, correct, although in some cases in breach of the
public procurement law51. This may indicate that the tasks performed at that
particular stage of project lifecycle do not pose any serious corruption threats.
A more detailed evaluation of project implementation shows, however, that
this initial assessment is incorrect. The most risky, from the point of view of
corruption threat at the stage of practical implementation of investment
projects, is the organisation of tenders and selecting project contractors. Those
are the responsibility of project beneficiaries, which in IROP are usually
territorial self–governments. For IROP Priority 2 and Measure 3.4. the duty to
arrange tenders is carried out by the so called implementing institutions, i.e.
voivodship self–governments. The quality of legal provisions regulating
public procurement and the quality of the system of supervising tender
procedures under IROP are critical for the evaluation of the threat of
corruption in this area.  
The public procurement regulations, in force in Poland not so long ago,
provided, according to experts52 and in view of the reports of the Supreme
Chamber of Control,53 a range of opportunities to not apply or to circumvent
the law. That carried a high risk of corruption. At the same time, the above
mentioned regulations were considered to be one of the main obstacles to
quick and effective absorption of structural funds. That was why, on  7 April
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2006, the Act regulating the issue of public procurement in Poland, which also
applies to the way IROP tenders are organised,  was amended54.  
The main changes brought by the amendment include55 raising the financial
threshold for projects that can apply simplified tender procedure. In
comparison to earlier regulations, it means raising that threshold ten times, to
the level of  60,000 Euro of project value. Under the new provisions, the
obligations related to observing time limits for carrying out tenders, including
submission of bids and the possibility to file appeals and complaints against
tender results, have been liberalised. The ordering party has retained
significant freedom to set the deadlines for application submission and placing
the bids. That can lead to a situation where the dates may be set in such a way
as to make it possible only for the “chosen” contractors to prepare an
application or a bid on time. In addition, financial thresholds for projects
requiring the most strict procedures have been raised and the powers of the
agency regulating public procurement (i.e. Public Procurement Office) have
been limited. The amendment has deprived the President of the Public
Procurement Office of the rights related to issuing permissions in a number of
cases, for instance to use the free order procedure, to negotiations without
prior announcement, etc. It has left the decision as to the use of the above
mentioned procedures solely in the hands of the interested ordering party. The
Act does not provide any mechanisms that would allow for  some systemic
monitoring and verification of the performance of contracts with respect to
public procurement. For instance, it contains a provision56 that orders the
exclusion from the proceedings of a, so called, dishonest contractor, that is a
contractor who has failed to deliver a public contract or has not delivered it
properly. However, because of the lack of a system for monitoring the
implementation of public orders, the above mentioned provision is practically
never applied. 
All the above mentioned changes to the law on public procurement go in
the direction of expediting and facilitating the expenditure of structural funds
in Poland. At the same time, they increase the possibility of corruption
occurrence. According to experts57, they may result in an increase of the costs
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of investment projects and in monopolising the tenders by enterprises and
municipal companies with links to local politicians58. For that reason, the
discussed stage of project implementation should be considered the most
threatened with corruption within the whole  IROP system.      
Monitoring and financial supervision system 
Also the monitoring and supervision functions have been largely
transferred to central government administration, and in some parts, also
centralised. Thus, the second, after programming, most important role of
regional politicians has been given into the hands of the government and the
government administration. Main responsibilities for IROP monitoring  are
with the Monitoring Committee operating at the IROP Managing Ministry.
The Committee is composed of representatives of government administration
(central and voivodship), representatives of voivodship self–governments,
national organisations of territorial self–government as well as social and
economic partners. The tasks of this body include i/a analysis of the process
of IROP implementation, also from the point of view of achieving the regional
policy objectives set out in the programme. The Committee also examines and
approves all proposals for changes in the implementation of the programme.
At the regional level, there are sub–committees monitoring the
implementation of the programme in a given voivodship. They operate under
the supervision of voivods, and within the structures of Voivodship Offices
there are appropriate departments specialising in monitoring the process of
IROP implementation. Voivodship Offices are also responsible for checking
whether the principles of public contracting are correct and whether public
procurement contracts are delivered by beneficiaries. Monitoring
sub–committees have relatively small scope of competence, of only auxiliary
nature, in relation to central institutions. They approve IROP implementation
reports in a given voivodship and may file requests with the IROP Managing
Ministry for changes to the programme.      
Monitoring sub–committees are collective bodies, consisting of
representatives of government administration (voivodship and central),
voivodship self–government, local self–governments and civil society and
business organisations from the region. As in the case of RSCs we may,
however, be critical about the representativeness of those committees in
relation to programme stakeholders. The fact that they operate under the aegis
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of a voivod, means that it is the voivods who organise the development of
regional partnership between different types of self–government and civil
society organisations. Thus, voivods enter the sphere of regional and local
policy which should be in the exclusive domain of voivodship
self–governments.  This also makes them active players on the regional
political scene. It provides space for the development of political corruption
and using the influence of the voivod for the purpose of the local electoral
game and party influence. Such a format of political activity becomes evident
during dIPAutes surrounding IROP, between a voivod and a Marshal (head of
the regional self–government), which often have political undertones.  
Limited participation of voivodship self–governments in monitoring IROP
implementation reduces the possibility of implementing the regional policy by
self–government politicians.   It also weakens the regional politicians’ ability
to correct various irregularities in the operation of the territorial administration
implementing  IROP, including fight with corruption. In addition, on the
regional level, there are no special procedures to counter corruption, such as a
system of reporting irregularities and corruption suspicions (whistleblowing).
The Institute of Public Affairs research shows59, that none of the Marshal
Offices’ Internet sites contains information about a possibility to report
corruption in the implementation of IROP measures. Little interest of regional
decision–makers in fighting corruption may be related to the insufficient
competencies of regions and the limited responsibility of regional politicians
for monitoring of the programme. Centralisation of monitoring and
supervision procedures is not only wrong from the point of view of managing
regional development, but it is also inefficient and ineffective in identifying
and combating irregularities. Thus centralisation of the monitoring and
supervision system is not a sufficient guarantee for effective prevention of
corruption. An example to illustrate that argument is the operation of the fiscal
system, playing an important supervision role in proper expenditure of
structural funds. Tax inspection offices in every voivodship are responsible for
in–depth inspection of 5 percent of IROP expenditure, based on a
representative sample of financial transactions and projects implemented
under the programme. Practically, it means a detailed verification of
expenditure and the way of delivering particular projects on the investment
site. A pre–condition for launching that system is issuing appropriate
methodological guidance and the selection of a control sample by the Bureau
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of International Fiscal Relations located at the Finance Ministry (i.e. the
paying institution). However, according to a report of the Supreme Chamber
of Control, the above mentioned institution has not implemented the
appropriate procedures that would enable the launch of the supervision
system60. In spite of the fact that almost one million PLN (approx. 250
thousand Euro) has been spent on experts work, the Manual on control
procedures has been in many places incompatible with European law and thus,
useless for tax offices. This may mean that, in spite of strict EU regulations for
using EU funds, a possibility that irregularities, including corruption, will
occur in Poland is relatively high. It is not the fault of legal regulations, but
the fault of weakness of control systems and delays in the practical
implementation of European law.  
The Ministry of Finance is also to blame for the troubles related to the
operation of the SIMIK computer system, necessary for proper financial
supervision of IROP projects. Even though the EU regulations require the use
of separate accounting systems for structural funds and a separate accounting
code for all financial transactions within IROP, yet, poorly working main IT
tool, i.e. the SIMIK computer programme, effectively hinders putting those
standards into practice.  
Another example of delays and not very accurate implementation of
supervision procedures is reporting by the IROP Managing Ministry to the
European Commission on financial irregularities within IROP. That is the
basis on which the procedure is launched to recover the sums already paid
from structural funds, together with interest. This is probably the most painful
sanction against entities that use IROP fund in an improper way, and,
indirectly, a tool to counter corruption.  A NIK report shows that notification
of irregularities has not been done on time and has not followed the adopted
procedures61. It is worth remembering that we are now just at the beginning of
the discussed procedure, as it only applies to funds to be reimbursed from the
EU budget and in case of most of the projects the accounts have not been
settled yet.  
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Summary
The system of managing the IROP does not sufficiently prevent the
occurrence of political and administrative corruption. An analysis of the
IROP management system proves that it is the project selection
procedures and the tendering procedures that are the most corruption
prone. In case of project selection the most important threat is the occurrence
of political corruption. That is related with the non–merit influence of local
political politicians on the selection of projects. The IPA research has found,
first of all, a tendency for improper influencing related to the constituency of
political decision–makers (territorial influence), to a lesser extent related to
party influence or personal contacts. The main threat in case of tender
procedures is administrative corruption. It has also been noted,  that the tender
regulations amended in 2006 improve the efficiency of public spending, but at
the same time significantly increase the risk of corruption.  
Most projects implemented under IROP are selected in open competitions
announced regularly for particular measures of the Programme.  Beneficiaries
submit their own proposals for the implementation of particular measures of
the IROP. It is rarely the case that big projects are entered for implementation
in the regional Programme Complement. From the point of view of corruption
prevention it is less important whether the projects have been submitted in
open competitions or whether they have been included earlier in the
operational programme in the form of larger projects. For countering
corruption the following are of key importance:
(1) proper quality of procedure and institutions responsible for
project selection and  
(2) the quality of the procedure of selecting an investor to implement
a given project  (that is the tendering procedure).
The important points are, in particular (a) maximum simplification and
transparency of those processes, (b) transparency of the selection criteria, (c)
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quality of the legal regulations defining the selection principles, with
particular emphasis placed on special regulations to prevent corruption, (d)
precise definition of the role of politicians and officials in both processes, (e)
appropriate design of the institutions responsible for decision–making. 
Summarising the analysis of the corruption threat in the management
system of IROP, attention could be drawn to the following conclusions:
1) The way of informing about activities undertaken during the
implementation of the programme is insufficient, which in some
cases may be conducive to corruption. That applies in particular to the
collection of applications and then the selection of projects. An example
of a lack of sufficient information may be the cases when the schedule
of subsequent calls for projects was not published by voivodship
self–governments, the time given for submission of applications was too
short, insufficient or simply no content–related justification of project
selection decisions was provided. 
Regulations concerning transparency of competition procedures,
and in particular those regulating the way of presenting
information by voivodship self–governments are imprecise,
inappropriate or they are wrongly interpreted by regional
governments.  The regulations defined by the ministry managing the
IROP62 do not provide for any coherent standard of presenting
information on the Internet websites. There are no detailed regulations
concerning the scope of information on particular stages of competitions
procedures to be presented. For instance, there is no obligation to
publicise the grounds for decisions of the Voivodship Boards changing
the order of the project ranking list63. The regulation included in the
Manual on IROP implementation procedure concerning the restrictions
to making the information of the composition of the experts panel public
is inappropriate64. Quite often the regulations are wrongly interpreted by
voivodship self–government, which practically leads to limiting the
access to information. 
2) A great obstacle to proper implementation of project selection
procedures, and later of project delivery and supervision of financial
flows, is the lack of a properly operating computer system SIMIK.
In increases the risk of corruption. 
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3) NIK inspection of IROP showed that the centralisation of the
management process, taking into account burdening of the Minister of
Regional Development with a variety of tasks, considering shortage and
high turnover of staff, extended the process of structural funds
absorption. It has also reduced the possibility of correct implementation
of regional policy by voivodship self–governments, having failed to
take full account of the specific character and the initiative of regions65.
Centralisation of IROP management leads to appearance of
“bottlenecks” in the management process and pile–up of work for
officials. It causes excessive haste and pressure from political
decision–makers to have the structural funds absorbed as quickly as
possible.  According to the N+266 rule it may happen that some of them
will remain unused. In such conditions different administrative
irregularities may appear, including also cases of corruption.
Centralisation of management makes it also difficult to carry out
monitoring and supervision activities. Government institutions are
responsible for delays in launching appropriate procedures of financial
supervision and of the computer system SIMIK, as well as for failing to
enforce certain EU regulations concerning the use of structural funds. 
4) The separation of functions related to project implementation from
supervision functions is critical for countering corruption. In
addition, it is justified to separate the programming phase, which
should be implemented by regional politicians, from the project
selection and implementation phases, which should be implemented
by experts and officials. At the same time, regional politicians should
have appropriate  instruments  to supervise the work of officials and to
monitor project implementation. Under IROP, regional politicians do
not have proper supervision instruments, and their role in monitoring
has been significantly diminished and transferred to the central level.
Self–government politicians, on the other hand, actively participate in
project selection, and the imperfect procedure creates favourable climate
for political corruption. Also the position of voivods in creating regional
and local partnership favours such phenomena. The structure of the
IROP management system and the division of responsibilities between
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different public authorities create institutional incentives for political
corruption. 
5) One of the reasons for improper participation of regional and local
politicians in project selection procedure is the centralisation of the
regional development programming, that is depriving local politicians
of a possibility to exert real influence on the programming of the
development of their own voivodships. In order to improve the
mangement of regional programmes it is necessary to restore the
quality of regional development programming by local politicians.
An important element of the reform of regional development
programming is to base it on the preparation of a voivodship
development strategy and operational programmes by self–government
regional authorities in agreement with local self–governments.  In the
current situation, the voivodship development strategy document is
simply a general planning document of limited practical value, which is
used as a “cover” for irregularities during project selection.
Decentralisation of regional development programming from the level
of the IROP managing ministry down to the regional self–government
level should be combined with such a design of programme
management system for the years 2007–2013 that would focus the
attention of politicians only on programming and supervision activities
and leave the project selection to officials and experts. 
6) An example of an improper division of responsibilities between
officials/experts and regional politicians can be inadequately
designed institutions responsible for IROP management. An
example of that can be regional steering committees, which in their
current form, contribute to increasing the risk of political corruption.
The bodies representing local and regional politicians should only
participate in development programming (preparation of strategic and
operational documents) and in supervising the proper implementation of
the regional development policy by officials. Politicians should not
therefore select particular projects, but they should only formulate
priorities and essential regional policy activities and should monitor
whether the projects selected by officials are consistent with the
essential regional policy objectives. Participation of politicians
representing certain territorial interests (that is the interests of their own
voters from particular gminas) in bodies involved in project selection
inevitably contributes to the occurrence of the territorial  (and
non–merit) bias in project selection. Politicians will attach higher value
to ingratiating themselves with their voters and to their own re–election
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than to the substantive criteria of regional development. In such a
situation it is only natural that a project selection logic develops,
following the principle: “today we are voting for your project, tomorrow
for mine”67. That is why in the future management system (for the years
2007–2013) regional steering committees should be merged with the
regional monitoring committees. The competencies of those new
regional committees should be limited only to supervision and
monitoring functions.  
7) In relation to regional steering committees, the IPA research has also
shown the  problem of inadequate representation of certain social
groups. Selection of those representatives has not been governed by any
appropriate regulations, which led to situations when voivodship
self–governments acquired excessive influence over the operation of
those bodies. In case of creating collective bodies designed to supervise
the management of regional programmes in the years 2007–2013, the
following will be of utmost importance: (a) appropriate way of selecting
delegates to such bodies, (b) transparency of selection regulations and
criteria, (c) transparency of selection process with respect to the public
and (d) representativeness of the members in relation to social groups
interested in being involved in regional development programmes. The
above mentioned conditions are also necessary to establish appropriate
partnership between self–government authorities and civil society
organisations.  
8) Excessively complex regulations and documentation the
beneficiaries are required to submit, as well as frequent changes of
rules and regulations, are an important factor conducive to
development of administrative corruption. 
IROP management procedure is multi–stage and is implemented by
a number of different public institutions at the regional and central
levels. Some procedures are duplicated, which additionally extends the
project lifecycle. Not in all cases is the distribution of various
administrative functions among different institutions justified from the
point of view of countering corruption. For instance, separation of
project selection stage implemented by voivodship self–government
from the financial implementation of the project by government
administration is not particularly important. It is much more important
to create: (a) a simple and relatively short project lifecycle procedure, (b)
precise regulation preventing abuse and (c) and efficient system of
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supervision and enforcement of adopted regulations. That is why an
excessively complicated procedure and duplication of certain activities
may be bad from the point of view of the corruption threat. It may also
be conducive to dispersion of responsibility for possible administrative
irregularities.  
9) A serious fault of the IROP management system is the imprecise
regulation aimed at preventing administrative irregularities and
corruption. There is also a shortage of special procedures to prevent
corruption, e.g. related to establishing a system of reporting the
irregularities and suspicions of corruption (whistleblowing). Another
regulation, aimed at preventing the conflict of interest, appointing
professional and independent experts evaluating the projects, etc. is also
imprecise. At the same time, an additional factor increasing the risk of
corruption consists in insufficient implementation of existing
regulations, limited disciplinary sanctions for their breach and poor
supervision of how the standards aimed at preventing administrative
irregularities are observed.   
The analysis of corruption threat in the management system of IROP also
shows certain regularities in the operation of Polish administration, related to
administrative and political culture and the tradition of a socialist state68. The
most important conclusions referring to these phenomena include:
● Critical for the practical operation of IROP are informal rules of
behaviour and standards of political culture. Those worth mentioning
include reluctance of the administration to act openly before the public and
to include social partners in its activities, as well as a very strongly political
character of the functioning of public administration69. 
● Standards of administrative and political culture often override, in
practice, the formal provisions of law. It is one of the reasons why
practical implementation of certain regulations is delayed, and others are not
properly implemented or are only implemented superficially. A sign of a low
public respect for the law is the weakness of systems for monitoring and
supervising the way in which IROP is implemented and introducing
sanctions in case of any irregularities.  
● Some institutions legitimise administrative or political activities, which
significantly diverge from the objectives for which they have been
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established, and sometimes they even serve the purpose of sanctioning
pathologies or corruption. For instance, Regional Steering Committees do
not properly fulfil their function consisting in monitoring whether projects
have been correctly selected from the point of view of their content, nor do
they appropriately represent entities involved in IROP in the region. Instead,
they actually legitimise decisions taken in accordance with local political
culture, which, in some cases, raise reasonable corruption suspicions. Some
regulations are re–interpreted by local officials or politicians contrary to the
intentions of those who designed the management system, and sometimes
even in evident contradiction with those intentions and the spirit of the law.
For instance, the guidelines of the IROP Managing Ministry, aimed at
increasing the openness of the project selection procedure, have in some
regions been used to actually limit the public access to the results and the
justification of administrative decisions. Similarly, the confidentiality
declarations which are supposed to protect personal data, commercial or
business secrets, are actually used to restrict the openness of information on
how the individual members of the decision–making bodies voted. They can
also cause certain people to refrain from reporting  irregularities. 
● The wrong structure of the division of powers in the IROP management
system and the standards of political culture also lead to a wrong
interpretation of political correctness.  For instance, in project selection it
has been considered right to divide the funds equally among all local
self–governments in a given voivodship.  Thus, implementation of IROP
leads to creating new standards of political culture.  Indeed, they do provide
safeguards against suspicions of political corruption, but at the same time
they go far away from the essence of regional policy, which should be driven
by different merit criteria and not just by the principle of allocating the same
amount of funds to all interested parties. Thus, not only some institutions
involved in  IROP implementation, but also the newly emerging political
standards actually block the opportunities for the development of
self–government regional policy.
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